Race, Gender and Beauty: The Effect of Information Provision on Online
  Hiring Biases by Leung, Weiwen et al.
Race, Gender and Beauty: The Effect of Information 
Provision on Online Hiring Biases 
Weiwen Leung 
iamweiwenleung@gmail.com 
Zheng Zhang 
University of Rochester 
Rochester, NY, United States 
zzhang95@cs.rochester.edu 
Daviti Jibuti 
CERGE-EI 
Prague, Czech Republic 
djibuti@cerge-ei.cz 
 
Jinhao Zhao 
jinha14@tsinghua.org.cn 
Maximillian Klein 
max@notconfusing.com 
Casey Pierce 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, United States 
cbspierc@umich.edu 
 
Lionel Robert 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, United States 
lprobert@umich.edu 
Haiyi Zhu 
Carnegie Mellon University 
Pittsburgh, United States 
haiyiz@cs.cmu.edu 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We conduct a study of hiring bias on a simulation platform 
where we ask Amazon MTurk participants to make hiring 
decisions for a mathematically intensive task. Our findings 
suggest hiring biases against Black workers and less attractive 
workers, and preferences towards Asian workers, female work- 
ers and more attractive workers. We also show that certain 
UI designs, including provision of candidates’ information 
at the individual level and reducing the number of choices, 
can significantly reduce discrimination. However, provision 
of candidate’s information at the subgroup level can increase 
discrimination. The results have practical implications for 
designing better online freelance marketplaces. 
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CCS Concepts 
•Human-centered computing → Human computer inter- 
action (HCI); Haptic devices; User studies; 
 
INTRODUCTION 
An increasing number of Americans are earning money 
through freelance jobs obtained through online platforms. In- 
deed, a report from Pew Research Center [29] indicates that 
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8% of Americans earn money from these “digital gigs". Web- 
sites that host these services facilitate supplemental income 
for some workers, and become a primary income source for 
others. The report also said that 14% of Black respondents 
and 11% of Latino respondents reported earning money on 
these platforms during the previous year, in contrast to 5% of 
White respondents. Among these non-White workers, 65% of 
them describe the income they earn from these platforms as 
“essential" or “important." Additionally, 55% of gig workers 
are female. 
One important question is the extent to which different types 
of hiring biases exist on these platforms, both with respect to 
easily quantifiable characteristics such as race and gender, but 
also less easily quantifiable characteristics such as beauty. 
Racial discrimination in offline hiring has been well docu- 
mented, especially in the US. In particular, there is significant 
discrimination against African-Americans and Latinos in hir- 
ing, [4, 27]. Biases based on gender [5] and beauty [21] are 
also prevalent. 
However, there are good reasons to suspect that online plat- 
forms may lessen or eliminate hiring biases. For example, 
Morton et al. [22] use observational data to show that while 
racial minorities pay 2% more for cars when purchasing them 
offline, this gap is much smaller for online purchases. They 
attribute this to the internet facilitating information search and 
removing cues present in offline negotiations. To the extent 
that such considerations are applicable, the internet may have 
a similar impact in the digital gig market. 
Another underexplored question is whether user interface (UI) 
design factors can affect hiring biases. An answer would 
shed light on whether existing results on discrimination are 
largely a product of mutable factors such as UI design, or 
whether they are likely to generalize to other settings. More 
broadly, it would inform us if there are practical implications 
of knowing the factors that cause discrimination. Guryan et 
al. [12] note that this is an important unanswered question 
even in the economics literature on discrimination, which has 
existed for over 50 years. 
To examine the prevalence of different types of biases in on- 
line hiring, as well as examine the effects of different design 
factors on biases, we conducted a study by setting up a task on 
Amazon MTurk in which we recruited 206 subjects to make 
hiring decisions in a platform simulating a website recruit- 
ing people for freelance jobs. We examine first and foremost 
how hiring rates are affected by gender, race, and beauty. We 
then examine whether the number of people displayed and/or 
performance information affect hiring decisions. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
Biases and Discrimination in Hiring 
Since the seminal article by Bertrand and Mullainathan [4], 
the discrimination literature has seen explosive growth. Key 
areas of study have been racial and gender discrimination. 
Edelman et al. [10] find that people with distinctively African- 
American names are 16 percent less likely to be accepted as 
guests on AirBnB compared to those with distinctively White 
names. Pope and Sydnor [25] study online loans on the peer- 
to-peer website Prosper.com, and find that loan listings with 
Blacks1 in the attached picture are 25 to 35 percent less likely 
to receive funding than those of Whites with similar credit 
profiles. However, despite the higher average interest rates 
charged to Blacks, lenders making such loans earn a lower 
net return compared to loans made to whites with similar 
credit profiles because Blacks have higher relative default rates. 
There is also evidence consistent with such discrimination in 
online environments. For example, an observational study 
found that Black people tend to get more negative reviews 
than other races [13], which could harm their employment 
opportunities. To our knowledge, there has been less study of 
discrimination against other races such as Asians. 
Gender discrimination has also been studied; whether or not 
females are discriminated against depends heavily on the task 
and context. For example, Bohnet et al. [5] find pro-female 
discrimination in hiring on language tasks and anti-female 
discrimination in mathematics tasks when candidates are eval- 
uated one at a time. However, discrimination disappears when 
more upvotes. The authors explain their findings could be due 
to people having incorrect belief about female math ability. 
Interestingly, there is no evidence for gender discrimination 
with regards to posted answers, and the authors attribute it 
to the decreased subjectivity over whether answers should be 
upvoted (as compared to questions). Gender discrimination 
can also vary over time; a 2017 study of LinkedIn data found 
that gender discrimination has decreased significantly over the 
past 10 years [30]. 
A small but growing literature examines how decision makers 
are affected by attractiveness. In a highly cited lab experiment, 
Mobius and Rosenblat [21] find a sizable beauty premium 
in hiring, as physically attractive workers are more confident 
and considered more able by employers, and are also thought 
to have better oral skills. Jenq et al. [17] study an online 
charitable microfinance website, and find that borrowers who 
are more attractive receive funding more quickly. 
In this paper, we explore the extent to which different forms 
of hiring biases based on gender, race, and attractiveness can 
manifest themselves in a online freelancer marketplace, and 
then examine the effect of UI design on hiring biases. 
We focus on math as our task domain because race-based 
and gender-based stereotypes on math are well-documented 
in the literature [11]. Furthermore, multiple sources indicate 
gender and racial gaps in SAT math scores that have persisted 
over time. In particular, males outperform females2, Asians 
outperform Whites, and Whites outperform both Blacks and 
Latinos3. 
Based on these, we formulate H1 to H5. Note that the hy- 
potheses are formulated under the assumption that in each hy- 
pothesis, workers from each subgroup are on average equally- 
qualified4 from the employer’s perspective (i.e. what the em- 
ployer can observe). We design our experimental trials such 
that this assumption holds. 
H1. Females will be hired less frequently than males. 
H2. Asians will be hired more frequently than Whites. 
H3. Whites will be hired more frequently than Blacks. 
H4. Whites will be hired more frequently than Latinos. 
H5. A more beautiful person will be hired more often than a 
less beautiful person.5 
candidates are evaluated jointly.  Coffman et al.  [9] study    
gender discrimination when candidates are evaluated two at a 
time for male stereotyped tasks, and find discrimination when 
two candidates’ prior performance are equal, but not when 
there is a candidate with a stronger prior performance. Finally, 
a field experiment on mathematics Stackexchange [6] found 
that low-reputation users with female usernames receive less 
upvotes for questions they post relative to those with male 
usernames. However, the direction of discrimination reverses 
at high reputation levels: those with female usernames receive 
 
 
1We use “Black” instead of “African-American” to be consistent with 
the original study. In the rest of the paper, we use terminology that is 
consistent with the underlying sources as far as possible. 
2http://www.aei.org/publication/2016-sat-test-results-confirm- 
pattern-thats-persisted-for-45-years-high-school-boys-are-better-at- 
math-than-girls/,     https://www.fairtest.org/sat-act-gender-gaps 
3https://www.brookings.edu/research/race-gaps-in-sat- 
scores-highlight-inequality-and-hinder-upward-mobility/, 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/09/27/scores-new- 
sat-show-large-gaps-race-and-ethnicity 
4For example, candidates without any prior observable performance 
are equally-qualified. Candidates with the same observable perfor- 
mance are also equally-qualified. 
5We are not aware of any data that examines the correlation between 
beauty and math test scores. However, H5 is based on the studies we 
cited [17, 21] which found more favorable outcomes for beautiful 
people. 
User-Interface Design 
There are many ways in which user interface design can affect 
behavior. One important way is through the provision of infor- 
mation. For example, certain subgroups may be less likely to 
be hired as they are perceived to be less productive than other 
subgroups, a phenomenon known as statistical discrimination. 
However, the provision of information on individuals’ perfor- 
mance on previous tasks can reduce statistical discrimination 
[3]. 
In contrast, the effect of information on how certain subgroups 
performed can either reduce or increase hiring disparities 
across different subgroups. For example, if subgroup A is 
hired more often than subgroup B, but information reveals 
that both subgroups are equally productive, then information 
about subgroup performance should reduce the gap. In con- 
trast, if both subgroups are hired equally often, but information 
reveals that subgroup A is more productive, then subgroup per- 
formance information should result in workers from subgroup 
A being hired more often. 
Based on these, we propose H6 and H7. 
H6. Provision of information at the individual level (how the 
candidate did in previous tasks) can reduce hiring bias. 
H7. Provision of information at the subgroup level (how 
the candidate’s subgroup did in previous tasks) moves hiring 
biases in the direction of the productivity difference across 
different subgroups. 
In our experiment, we examine how the provision of informa- 
tion at the individual level (how the candidate did in previous 
tasks) and subgroup level (how one’s subgroup did in previous 
tasks) affect hiring decisions. 
Another way that UI changes can affect decision making is by 
altering the choice environment by using behavioral “nudges” 
[31]. For example, Lee et al. [20] find that behavioral eco- 
nomics persuasion techniques such as having default options 
can lead to people making healthier food choices. 
One well-known nudge is to vary the number of options to 
choose from (i.e. the size of the choice set). A famous study 
showed that people are much more likely to buy jam when 
faced with 6 varieties than when faced with 24 varieties [16], 
a phenomenon known as “choice overload”. While we know 
that increasing the number of options makes one less likely 
to make a choice [8], what is less well known is the effect on 
which choice is made. Our study contributes to this literature 
by providing more insight into how choice overload affects 
which choice is made, with a focus on equity concerns. 
In the context of online hiring, we propose that the size of the 
choice set can influence hiring biases. One natural hypothe- 
sis may be that increasing the number of candidates for hire 
may lead to people use heuristics - gender-based or race-based 
stereotypes. Indeed, under Kahneman’s dual system frame- 
work, people are more likely to use heuristics when overloaded 
with information [18], and one of the few studies examining 
the impact of choice set size on which choice is made found 
that people tended to go with easy-to-understand (e.g. less 
risky) options when the choice set expanded [15]. We hypoth- 
esize that people are more likely to use heuristics that will 
accentuate existing biases (e.g. those based on stereotypes) 
when faced with a larger choice set, and hence formulate our 
eighth hypothesis as below. 
H8. Increasing the number of candidates to choose from can 
increase hiring bias. 
 
EXPERIMENT DESIGN 
We designed an experiment where participants were told they 
would be making hiring decisions for a mathematically inten- 
sive task. We told participants6 that potential employees had 
completed two sets of mathematical questions, one easy set 
and one difficult set (Round 1 and Round 2 respectively). Both 
sets had five questions each. We showed participants example 
questions from both sets. The easy questions were similar in 
difficulty to easy SAT questions, and the difficult questions 
were similar in difficulty to difficult SAT questions. 
We designed our experiment around mathematically intensive 
tasks for several reasons. First, clear stereotypes exist, at 
least with regards to gender [11]. Second, the discrimination 
literature often uses mathematically intensive tasks as a subject 
of study [5, 6, 9]. Finally, many gig work tasks involve the use 
of mathematics: a search of sites such as Fiverr and Upwork 
reveal thousands of math-related tasks. 
All participants were told there would be twelve hiring rounds, 
and they would make one hiring decision in each round. Par- 
ticipants were told they would see the photos of potential 
employees. A third of participants were told they would see 
two potential employees in each round, while another third 
were told they would see four, and the remaining third were 
told they would see eight. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the 
two potential employees condition. 
(In reality, the photos of potential employees were drawn from 
the Chicago Face Database, so that we could obtain measures 
of perceptions of race, gender, and attractiveness. However, 
we did ensure that the gender of the photo corresponded to the 
gender of the potential employee we in fact hired from MTurk 
to answer SAT-level math questions. We did not take photos 
of the people we had actually hired to solve mathematical 
questions because MTurk does not allow us to take or request 
photos from MTurkers.) 
To encourage participants to take hiring decisions seriously, 
participants were told that after they made all hiring decisions, 
one of their hires would be randomly selected, and they would 
be given a bonus of $1 for every question their person they 
hired on a randomly selected round had correctly solved on 
the difficult set7. 
A third of all participants saw the number of questions that 
potential employees correctly solved on the easy set (Figure 1 
shows a screenshot of a trial with such information), while a 
third of all participants saw the performance distribution by 
gender of questions that potential employees correctly solved 
 
 
6We recruited U.S. MTurkers who had completed at least 500 tasks 
and an acceptance rate of at least 97%. 
7There were a total of five questions, so the maximum bonus payout 
was $5 
  
 
Figure 1. Screenshot of two worker condition with performance on easy questions displayed. 
 
 
on the easy set before they made any hiring decisions (screen- 
shot available in Figure 2). The remaining third of participants 
did not see either. 
Because the photos shown to participants were chosen ran- 
domly from the Chicago Face Database (except with respect 
to gender), the expected past performance of potential em- 
ployees of each race was equal. Likewise, the expected past 
performance of potential employees was unaffected by their 
beauty. In addition, experimental trials were designed so that 
the average past performance of workers (that were displayed 
to participants) across genders would be exactly equal8. There- 
fore, if the race, gender, and beauty of a potential employee 
were immaterial to our participants, we should discover that 
these factors had no effect on hiring. 
All participants were given comprehension questions to make 
sure they understood the nature of the experiment (includ- 
ing that their payout would depend on the hiring decisions 
they made), and had to answer the comprehension questions 
correctly before they could proceed with hiring decisions. 
Observe from Figure 1 that before each hiring decision, we 
asked participants to predict the number of difficult questions 
each worker would answer correctly. This technique is known 
in the discrimination literature as “belief elicitation” (see e.g. 
[9]) and is used to examine whether discrimination (if present) 
is due to people’s beliefs about the productivity of different 
subgroups. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY 
We use discrete choice modelling to analyze our data. A 
discrete choice model is a form of agent-based model that is 
often used in economics [23], marketing [2], transportation 
[1], and public health [19], among other fields. 
In a discrete choice model, a decision maker chooses between 
different alternatives (e.g. products, healthcare options, trans- 
portation options, or in our case, potential employees). The 
 
 
8Details of our experimental trials can be found in the Appendix. 
decision maker computes the value of each alternative as the 
function of that alternative’s characteristics. 
Suppose that a decision maker is considering N alternatives 
(in our case, potential employees). In our case, a decision 
maker might compute the value of potential employee i (i ∈ 
{1, 2, ..., N}) follows: 
Valuei = β0 + β1Femalei + β2Asiani + β3Blacki + β4Latinoi + 
β5Attractivenessi 
where Femalei, Asiani, Blacki, Latinoi are variables indicating 
the gender and race of the worker. Attractivenessi is a contin- 
uous variable measuring the attractiveness of the worker. We 
did not ask our participants to evaluate the attractiveness, race, 
or gender of each potential employee (and doing so would be 
time consuming and interfere with participants’ decisions9). 
Instead, we proxied these variables by using their values from 
the corresponding photo in the Chicago Face Database, which 
was based on the results of a survey on the proportion of peo- 
ple who thought the person in the photo was female, Asian, 
Black10, or Latino, as well as the average attractiveness rating 
of the photo. This introduces measurement error, but classical 
measurement error biases our coefficient estimates towards 
zero, making it harder for us to find effects that in fact exist 
[32]. 
Decision makers want to choose the option with the highest 
value.  However, decision makers measure value with error 
e.g. because of errors in perception, errors in computation, or 
due to randomness in taste. The chance that they will choose 
a particular option is therefore a probabilistic function that 
increases as the value of that particular option increases, and 
decreases as the value of alternative options increase. The 
exact mathematical equations governing our model can be 
found in the Appendix. 
 
 
9However, we did ask participants to predict the number of difficult 
questions each participant would answer correctly, because such 
information was valuable and could not be proxied by data from 
other sources. 
10To be consistent with Chicago Face Database terminology, we use 
“Black" and not “African-American" 
  
Figure 2. Distribution of performance by gender, which was shown to randomly selected participants before they made their hiring decisions, along 
with a short explanation of how to interpret the distributions presented. 
 
 
The discrete choice model has several desirable properties. 
Perhaps most importantly, it takes into account that decision 
makers take into account the relative value of each alternative 
when making a decision. For example, an option with a value 
of 10 would likely be chosen if there was only one alternative 
option with a value of 1, but not if the alternative option had a 
value of 10011. The model also flexibly adjusts to the fact that 
the probability of choosing any alternative decreases when 
more choices are available, which is important for our case 
since we vary the number of potential employees. 
We use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) to estimate 
the parameters (β ’s) of our model. We cluster standard er- 
rors by participant because each participant makes multiple 
decisions12. 
Estimating the model using our entire sample allows us to 
estimate the overall effects of race, gender, and attractive- 
ness. To evaluate the effects of these variables under each 
experimental manipulation, we estimate the model using only 
data from participants who were exposed to that experimental 
manipulation. 
Recall that in the discrete choice model, our decision mak- 
ers estimate value. Thus our coefficient estimates should be 
interpreted as the marginal (additional) value of a given at- 
tribute. The effect on the probability of hiring can be computed 
through the use of odds ratios13. Note that since the probability 
 
 
11A standard linear/logistic regression only makes use of a given 
alternative’s characteristics, and it would be impossible or extremely 
difficult to replicate the flexibility of the discrete choice model by 
adding control variables especially since the size of the choice set 
varies across participants. 
12The usual formula for calculating standard errors is only valid when 
one participant makes one hiring decision. Making multiple decisions 
could introduce serial correlation. Using clustered standard errors 
allows us to adjust for such serial correlation by making it harder 
for us reject the null hypothesis relative to using the usual standard 
errors, as clustered standard errors are usually bigger [7]. 
13The odds ratio of a coefficient estimate of X is eX . Specifically, 
if a coefficient estimate of X indicates that a one unit increase in 
the explanatory variable is associated with a eX ­ 1 increase in the 
probability of hire, holding other explanatory variables constant. For 
example, X = 0.1 would correspond to roughly 10.5% increase. 
of hiring is monotonically increasing in value, positive coef- 
ficient estimates always indicate a positive effect of a given 
attribute on the probability of hire. 
Especially because our experiment involves manipulating race, 
gender, and beauty through the use of photos, our coefficient 
estimates should largely be interpreted as descriptive (correla- 
tional) rather than causal. Indeed, when our participants make 
hiring decisions, they may consider other factors besides race, 
gender and attractiveness. For example, suppose that people of 
a certain race are perceived as less trustworthy. Then what our 
model attributes to race may actually be caused by perceived 
trustworthiness. However, because our main interest lies in 
understanding the extent to which certain subgroups of work- 
ers face discrimination (e.g. African-Americans), regardless 
of the underlying cause, our coefficient estimates will actu- 
ally capture the desired effect. Additionally, in our additional 
analyses/robustness check section, we examine whether our 
results change when we add in other variables regarding the 
appearance of the person in the photo (e.g. trustworthiness). 
Recall also that our experiment was designed such that the 
workers from the different subgroups of interest were in fact 
on average observably equally-qualified. Hence, we can make 
claims regarding observably equally-qualified workers without 
controlling for previous performance. We do not control for 
previous performance because we do not display previous 
performance of workers to half of our participants. 
Before we discuss the results, we briefly note two limitations 
of our methodology. First, even though attractiveness was 
measured by independent coders engaged by the Chicago Face 
Database, notions of attractiveness may reflect Western con- 
cepts. Second, while our data covers male and female genders 
well, we may not be able to generalize to other genders. 
 
RESULTS 
Overview of the Findings 
Our main findings include: 
• Results suggested hiring biases against Black candidates, 
and  towards  Asian  candidates  and  female  candidates. 
Specifically, Black candidates are hired 16% less compared 
to White candidates; Asian candidates are hired 23% more 
compared to White candidates; female candidates are hired 
61% more than male candidates; there are no significant 
difference between White candidates and Latino candidates. 
H2 and H3 are supported, while H1 and H4 are not sup- 
ported. 
• Results suggested hiring biases toward more attractive can- 
didates. One standard deviation increase in the attractive- 
ness increased hiring chances by around 10%. H5 is sup- 
ported. 
• Provision of information at the individual level (how the 
candidate did in previous task) erased the differences be- 
tween White candidates, Asian candidates and Black can- 
didates, and the difference between attractive candidates 
versus non-attractive candidates, though it further increased 
the hiring chances of female candidates. H6 is largely or 
completely supported (depending on how one interprets the 
further increase in hiring chance for female candidates). 
• Provision of information at the subgroup level (how the 
most participants did not see the distribution of scores for easy 
SAT questions. 
The third row indicates the mean attractiveness score of photos 
that appeared in our experiment (by gender) as given by coders 
in the Chicago Face Database. Females were perceived to be 
more attractive than males. 
We now focus on participants who made hiring decisions (i.e. 
employers). They came from a wide variety of backgrounds. 
For example, they came from 34 U.S. states; the three states 
which contributed the most number of participants had 18%, 
12%, and 8% of the subject pool, and all other states each 
contributed 4% or less. 42% of the participants are females 
and are rest males. In terms of their highest educational level, 
3% of our sample have a high school diploma or lower and 
17% have either some college or a 2 year college degree. 45% 
of our subjects have 4 years of college degree, 29% have a 
masters degree and 6% have a professional degree. Although 
the sample skews towards the more educated, one might expect 
that the more educated are more likely to hire people in the 
gig economy due to higher income. Unfortunately, we did not 
collect data on race or mathematical ability15. 
candidate’s subgroup did in previous task) by gender did 
not decrease the hiring chances of female candidates. How- 
ever, it reduced the hiring chance for Black candidates, and 
increased the hiring chance for Asian candidates. We subse- 
quently discuss our interpretation of these results. 
• Increasing the number of candidates to choose from reduced 
the chance that Black candidates would be hired. H8 is 
supported. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 gives descriptive statistics associated with potential 
employees by gender. The first row indicates performance in 
Round 1 (easy SAT math questions) by gender of the candi- 
dates that we hired to answer math questions. We see that 
males perform better in the Round 1 compared to females, 
however, the difference is insignificant. As the table shows, 
When asked explicitly whether math was associated with a 
particular gender, subjects tended to associate math with males 
(rather than females). Only 17% of our sample somewhat 
associate math with females, with 26% do not associate math 
with any gender and remaining 43% associate it with males. 
On the other hand, approximately equal numbers of subjects 
associate liberal arts with females (35%) and males (32%), 
while a third of participants (33%) think itâA˘ Z´ s not related 
to any specific gender. Note that demographics and opinions 
were only collected at the end of the study. 
 
 
Female Male p­value 
Round 1 performance 2.04 2.21 0.49 
(0.16) (0.20) 
Prediction 2.73 2.66 0.006 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
 
ers had 5 questions to answer. 
The second row indicates the mean predicted score of can- 
didates14 that were given by participants in our experiment. 
Participants expected females to perform significantly better in 
Round 2 (harder SAT math questions). Females were expected 
to outperform males. Many explanations for this difference 
are possible, but one possible explanation behind the higher 
prediction for female workers is that participants may have 
thought that gender discrimination was the topic of study and 
tried to counteract any implicit biases they held. Note also that 
predicted scores could have been higher for harder SAT math 
questions than actual scores for easy SAT questions because 
 
 
14Candidates that appeared to participants in our experiment. Recall 
that while we did hire MTurkers to solve easy and difficult math 
questions, we were not allowed to take photos of them, or ask them 
to supply photos. So we took photos of people from the Chicago 
Face Database, and matched it with the the workers we hired based 
on gender information. 
 
 
Table 1. Notes: Summary statistics by Gender. Standard errors in paren- 
thesis beneath mean estimates. The last columns shows p-values of the 
hypothesis of equal means across groups. 
 
In terms of race of the photos we took from the Chicago 
Face Database, almost a third of workers were White (31%) 
followed by African American (28%), Asian (22%) and His- 
panics (19%).16 
 
Discrete  Choice  Model:  Results  with  full  sample 
Estimating our table on the full sample indicates that attractive 
candidates are valued more and hence hired more often than 
observably equally-qualified unattractive candidates, as evi- 
denced by the positive and statistically significant coefficient 
of Attractivei.  Analogously, female candidates are valued 
 
 
15It might be useful for future work to examine the influence of 
mathematical ability on discrimination. 
16We define race in line with the Chicago Face Database definition. 
females answered, on average, 2.04 questions correctly, while Attractiveness score 3.44 3.08 0.000 
males managed to answer 2.21. Overall in the Round 1 work-  (0.01) (0.01)  
 
more and hence hired more often compared to observably 
equally-qualified male candidates, and Asian candidates are 
hired more often compared to observably equally-qualified 
White candidates (male and White are omitted categories; 
we do not mention the omitted categories from now on for 
brevity). However, Black candidates are valued less and hence 
hired less often relative to observably equally-qualified White 
candidates (see leftmost column of Table 2). (Note: We omit 
“observably equally-qualified” for brevity from now on. We’ll 
also use “hired more often" instead of “valued more and hence 
hired more often" from now on, and likewise “hired less often” 
means “valued less and hence hired less often”.) 
In sum, H2, H3 and H5 are supported, but H1 and H3 are 
not supported (we in fact observe the reverse of H1). As we 
discussed earlier, one possible explanation behind the higher 
hiring rates for female candidates compared to male candidates 
is that participants tried to counteract any implicit biases they 
held against female candidates. 
 
Showing prior performance 
When we do not show any performance information on easy 
mathematics questions, all explanatory variables that were 
significant in the full sample (i.e. in the analysis immediately 
preceding this) remain significant and have the same sign, 
with the exception of Blacki. The results indicate that Black 
candidates are not chosen at a different rate compared to White 
candidates (see second column of Table 2, which has heading 
“None”). 
When we show candidates’ individual performance on easy 
mathematics questions, attractiveness and race have no statis- 
tically significant effect on hiring (see "individual" column of 
Table 2). Female candidates are still hired more often, and in 
 
 
Full sample Prior performance shown 
 
 None Individual Subgroup 
Attractiveness 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.03 0.16*** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female prop 0.48*** 0.36*** 0.67*** 0.42*** 
 (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) 
Asian prop 0.21** 0.30** -0.07 0.36** 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) 
Black prop -0.17** 0.02 -0.18 -0.38*** 
 (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) 
Latino prop -0.12 0.20 -0.21 -0.37 
 (0.12) (0.20) (0.22) (0.23) 
Pseudo R2 0.025 0.026 0.032 0.031 
Table 2. Notes: The table shows estimation results of the Discrete Choice 
Model. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. ∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ 
p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
male candidates are hired more often. The variables indicating 
race are not statistically significant (see Table 3, column "2"). 
Participants who were asked to choose between four candi- 
dates at a time chose attractive candidates, female candidates 
and Asian candidates more often (and the effect is statistically 
significant at conventional levels). Black candidates are cho- 
sen less often, but the difference is not statistically significant 
at conventional levels (see Table 3, column "4"). 
Finally, participants who were asked to choose between eight 
candidates at a time chose attractive candidates and female 
candidates more often, and this difference is statistically sig- 
nificant. Black candidates were chosen less often. Asian 
candidates were chosen more often, though the difference is 
not significant at conventional levels (see Table 3, column 
"8"). 
fact the coefficient estimate of Female increases compared to    
when no information about prior performance is displayed. We 
conclude that H6 is largely or completely supported, depend- 
ing on how one interprets the further increase in likelihood of 
female candidates being hired. 
When we show the distribution of candidates’ performance on 
easy questions by gender, the chances of female candidates 
being hired did not decrease17, even though women actually 
performed slightly worse than men on the easy SAT-level math 
questions (relative to no information on prior performance). 
Although a more comprehensive test would have examined 
the impact of information on performance by other factors 
such as race (we only displayed subgroup information by 
gender to maximize statistical power), the available evidence 
does not support H7. However, we note that information on 
subgroup performance by gender reduced the hiring chances of 
Black candidates, while increasing the hiring chances of Asian 
candidates. Therefore, displaying performance by gender 
could have had behavioral effects e.g. trigger subconscious 
stereotypes about race. 
 
Number of candidates 
Among participants who were asked to choose between two  
candidates at a time, we find that attractive candidates and fe- 
17and actually increases slightly, though the difference is not statisti- 
cally significant at conventional levels 
Worker condition 
 
 
2 4 8 
Attractiveness 0.14** 0.13** 0.15*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Female prop 0.55*** 0.30*** 0.62*** 
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) 
Asian prop 0.10 0.35** 0.15 
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
Black prop -0.08 -0.13 -0.29** 
(0.13) (0.12) (0.13) 
Latino prop -0.07 0.02 -0.23 
(0.23) (0.20) (0.22) 
Pseudo R2 0.035 0.017 0.031 
 
 
Table 3. Notes: The table shows estimation results of the Discrete Choice 
Model. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. ∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ 
p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01. 
 
Additional analyses 
To examine whether the effects of attractiveness differ by the 
gender of the candidate, we add the interaction of Female and 
Attractiveness to our main specification.  As the estimation 
result shows, the coefficient of the interaction term is not sta- 
tistically significant, suggesting that increasing attractiveness 
has the same effect for male and female candidates (see Table 
4, column 1). 
When we add the predicted number of difficult math questions 
that candidates got right to our main specification18, we find 
that predicted score is positively and strongly correlated with 
happens when Feminine is added to the model. People that ap- 
pear feminine are more likely to be hired, and once Feminine 
is added, the effects of attractiveness and gender become much 
smaller in magnitude and statistically insignificant (see Table 
5, column 4). This suggests that appearing feminine (or mas- 
culine) may be an underlying mechanism for some of our 
results. 
the hiring decision. However, even after controlling for pre-    
dicted score, female and attractive candidates are still hired 
more often. Although the coefficients of race still have their 
expected signs, they become statistically insignificant at con- 
ventional levels (see Table 4, column 2). It appears that, at 
least for race, differences in hiring races can be explained by 
differences in predicted performance. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (0.04)   
PseudoR2 0.025 0.24 
 
 
Table 4. Notes: The table shows estimation results of the Discrete Choice 
Model. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. ∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ 
p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01. Column 1 adds "female" and "Attractiveness" 
interaction to the main specification, while column 2 adds "Prediction" 
as an additional independent variable. 
 
 
Are effects driven by other characteristics? 
To find possible underlying mechanisms, as well as to check 
whether other facial expression characteristics affect hiring 
decisions, we included those characteristics (as rated by in- 
dependent coders hired by the Chicago Face Database) as 
explanatory variables. Being perceived as angry significantly 
reduces workers’ chance of being employed (see Table 5, 
column 1), while appearing happy increases that probability, 
though the effect is statistically insignificant (see Table 5, col- 
umn 2). When Angry or Happy are added as control variables, 
all explanatory variables that were statistically significant in 
the original specification remain significant and have the same 
sign. In column 3, we examine what happens when perceived 
masculinity is added to the model. Workers that are perceived 
to be masculine are less likely to be hired, and in this model, 
the coefficient estimate of gender is no longer statistically 
significant at conventional levels. Column 4 examines what 
 
 
18Recall that we got participants to predict the number of difficult 
questions candidates answered correctly before making their hiring 
decision 
Table 5. Notes: The table shows estimation results of the Discrete Choice 
Model. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. ∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ 
p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.  Various characteristics from the Chicago Face 
Database are added to the main specification in this table. 
 
 
Further examining other facial expressions shows that "Domi- 
nant" and Threatening" face significantly reduces hiring proba- 
bility and "Trustworthy" face does not have significant impact 
on the result (see Table 6, columns 1-3). None of these vari- 
ables affect the significance of the other variables. 
We also conduct additional robustness checks by removing 
outliers (e.g. people that responded too quickly or slowly). 
Results are in the Appendix. 
 
EFFECT SIZES 
Recall that we can use odds ratios to compute effect sizes. For 
example, in the main sample, we find that Blacks are 16 per- 
cent less likely to be chosen than Whites (e­0.17 ­ 1 = ­0.16). 
The effect size is smaller than in Bertrand and Mullainathan 
[4], who find that African-Americans are 50 percent less likely 
to receive interview callbacks than Whites. However, the 
magnitude of discrimination still appears to be sizeable. 
The effects of our experimental manipulations are economi- 
cally meaningful as well. For example, in the two worker con- 
dition, Blacks are chosen around 7 percent less than Whites, 
but in the eight worker condition they are chosen around 25 
percent less than Whites. 
We give tables with odds ratios in the Appendix. 
Attractiveness 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.05 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Female prop 0.50*** 0.49*** 0.16 -0.00 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.16) (0.20) 
Asian prop 0.18** 0.20** 0.17* 0.19** 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Black prop -0.18** -0.18** -0.13* -0.14* 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Latino prop -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
Angry -0.11**    
 (0.04)    
Happy  0.04   
  (0.04)   
Masculine   -0.13**  
   (0.06)  
Feminine    0.18** 
    (0.07) 
PseudoR2 0.026 0.025 0.026 0.026 
 
 (1) (2) 
Attractiveness 0.08* 0.08** 
 (0.05) (0.04) 
Female prop 0.48*** 0.54*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) 
Female*Attractiveness 0.05  
 (0.06)  
Asian prop 0.20** 0.09 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
Black prop -0.17** -0.08 
 (0.07) (0.08) 
Latino prop -0.12 -0.09 
 (0.12) (0.14) 
Prediction  1.07*** 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Attractiveness 
 
Female prop 
0.14*** 
(0.03) 
0.42*** 
0.11** 
(0.04) 
0.48*** 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.46*** 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Asian prop 0.16* 0.17** 0.15* 
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
Black prop -0.14* -0.19*** -0.17** 
 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Latino prop -0.06 -0.10 -0.11 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) 
Dominant -0.13***   
 (0.05)   
Trustworthy  0.13  
  (0.09)  
Threatening   -0.14** 
   (0.05) 
PseudoR2 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Table 6. Notes: The table shows estimation results of the Discrete Choice 
Model. Standard errors are clustered at the subject level. ∗p < 0.1; ∗ ∗ 
p < 0.05; ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.  Various characteristics from the Chicago Face 
Database are added to the main specification in this table. 
 
 
 
POTENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS 
Our data do not allow us to pinpoint the underlying mechanism. 
However, we give an explanation that is consistent with the 
unexpected bias in favor of females, and the expected bias we 
found with regards to attractiveness and race. 
This explanation is based on the notion that awareness can 
reduce one’s subconscious biases. Racial bias in professional 
basketball referees persisted even after a study showed such 
bias [26], but disappeared after extensive media coverage 
of that study, suggesting that awareness reduced such bias 
[24]. Making crowdworkers aware of their own biases reduced 
their own biases [14], and academic promotion committees in 
scientific fields do not promote more men over women when 
they believe that gender bias exists [28]. 
It could be that participants thought that gender bias was the 
purpose of this study (being an often mentioned topic with 
regards to mathematical performance) and tried to correct for 
this bias, but were overzealous in correcting for it. However, 
were not aware of their subconscious racial and attractiveness 
biases in mathematics (perhaps because disparities by race and 
attractiveness in mathematics are less often mentioned) and 
did not correct for it. 
Regarding the effects of our manipulations on user interfaces, 
we speculate that showing prior performance at individual 
level may have resulted in participants’ attention diverted to- 
wards participants’ past performance, hence the effects of all 
other characteristics disappeared, except for the most salient 
characteristic (gender). Analogous explanations for our other 
results may also be possible. For example, displaying in- 
formation on performance across genders could have made 
participants more subconscious about other possible groupings 
of potential employees (e.g. race) and associated stereotypes. 
We emphasize that future research should examine the validity 
of this explanation. 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
The gig economy has many stakeholders, and each stakeholder 
can have multiple objectives (e.g. efficiency, equity). Here, 
we take the viewpoint of an online administrator concerned 
with equity. 
One implication that stands out is that choice overload can 
negatively affect certain subgroups. Indeed, there was much 
less evidence of racial discrimination in the two worker condi- 
tion than in the four or eight worker condition. If our results 
generalize, designers of the online freelance platforms should 
consider displaying candidates in a way that is less likely to 
trigger such choice overload. One possible technique that 
deserves further study is to limit the number of candidates 
displayed on each page. 
A second implication is that designers should be careful in pro- 
viding information designed to assist hiring decisions. Recall 
that the relationship between the amount of information and 
discrimination was not monotonic; there was some discrimina- 
tion when no information on past performance was provided, 
the most discrimination when information on performance by 
subgroup (gender) was provided, and the least discrimination 
when individual level performance was provided. Since an 
intuitive explanation is that subgroup information could have 
increased discrimination by reminding people to consider a 
person’s subgroup, designers of online freelance platforms 
should gather feedback before implementing significant UI 
changes, think carefully about equity concerns, and continu- 
ally monitor key metrics even after changes are implemented 
to make sure that subgroups are not unnecessarily adversely 
affected. 
The third, and potentially the most important, implication 
is that designers can consider making people aware of their 
subconscious biases. If our explanation that the lack of hiring 
bias against females was due to people being aware of this 
particular implicit bias is verified by future research, then 
online administrators can explore methods of making people 
aware of their biases. 
 
CONCLUSION 
We ran an MTurk experiment where we asked participants to 
make hiring decisions for a mathematically intensive task. We 
unexpectedly find that our participants hire females more often 
than males. However, racial discrimination occurs largely 
as expected: Blacks are hired less often than Whites and 
Asians are hired more often than Whites. Also, attractive 
candidates are hired more often than less attractive candidates. 
Moreover, racial discrimination increases as the number of 
workers a participant can choose from increases. Finally, the 
relationship between discrimination and information provided 
to assist hiring decisions is non-monotonic in the amount of 
information provided. 
The immediate takeaway is that since UI designs (reducing 
the number of choices and showing information of candidates 
at individual level) can reduce hiring biases, designers of on- 
line freelance platforms can do much to reduce hiring biases. 
Despite the limitations of our study in pinpointing the exact 
underlying mechanisms, our findings also serve as a call for 
further research in this area to determine under what contexts 
biases in hiring manifest themselves. 
Our paper contributes to several literatures. Our finding that 
UI factors can affect discrimination is relevant to the human- 
computer interaction literature as well as the discrimination 
literature. By illustrating the use of a discrete choice model to 
measure discrimination, we also highlight to the HCI commu- 
nity how agent-based modelling can be used to estimate the 
value of different characteristics in situations where decision 
makers have to choose between varying numbers of alterna- 
tives, as well as alternatives that vary across decisions. We also 
contribute to the choice overload literature by verifying that 
choice overload can affect employment decisions, as well as 
by illustrating how choice overload can affect equity concerns. 
We mentioned several limitations of our study previously at 
different points in the paper, but would like to mention a few 
more. One key limitation is generalizability: our study in- 
volved hiring people for mathematically intensive tasks. The 
kinds of discrimination that appear, as well as the methods of 
reducing such discrimination, may be different if the nature 
of the task were changed, particularly if the study were con- 
ducted in a field setting. Nonetheless, it is our belief that with 
persistent study and effort, it is possible to reduce discrimina- 
tion in many areas, and our paper shows the potential of UI 
design to decrease discrimination. 
Also, our findings may not generalize to settings without pho- 
tos, such as Amazon MTurk19. That said, many online plat- 
forms use photos in their worker profiles, such as TaskRabbit, 
Upwork and Fiverr (to name a few). Even non-gig work mar- 
ketplaces such as AirBnB, Uber, and Lyft use photos in their 
worker profiles (and racial discrimination based on photos has 
been documented in all three of them). Finally, the use of 
photos in offline resumes is common in European countries 
such as Germany, as well as China and Japan. Therefore, 
while it would be useful for future work to examine a setting 
without photos, we would argue that at the time of writing, 
an experiment that uses photos is at least as important (if not 
more important) than an experiment that does not. 
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19It also will not generalize to MTurk because on MTurk, employ- 
ers (or more precisely, requesters) do not choose workers. Rather, 
employers set criteria, and anyone who meets them can start the task. 
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